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Protecting Consumers from Cybersquatters:

Is the ACPA Standing Up?
Heather E. Nolan*

I. Introduction
Consumers are smarter today than they ever have been. The
Internet holds great promise for the American consumer to exercise
that know-how. However, cybersquatting I is keeping consumers from
cashing in on that promise. While they may have millions of
megabytes of information at their fingertips, the information presented
to consumers may be deceiving or fraudulent. How is a consumer to
verify the source of each product and piece of information in this new
world of electronic storefronts and one-click purchasing? Many
consumers lack the resources to verify the source or authenticity of the
information they receive and even more are unaware that they should
question it.
Consumers increasingly rely on trademarks and the goodwill
equity of valuable brand names to locate the true source of genuine
goods and services on the Internet.2 The graphical interface on a
website and its address are often the only indications of the source and3
authenticity of the site and the goods and services available thereon.
Thus, consumers have a difficult time distinguishing a genuine site
from a pirate site. 4 With such an abundance of information available
* J.D. candidate, May 2003, Loyola University Chicago School of Law;
B.S. Consumer Science and Personal Finance, 2000, University of Wisconsin Madison.
See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 2 (1999) (defining "cybersquatters" as those who
"register[ ], traffic[ ] in, or use ... a domain name that is identical to, confusingly
similar to, or dilutive of a trademark or service mark of another that is distinctive at
the time of registration of the domain name, without regard to the goods or services
of the parties, with the bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of another's
mark.").
2
1d. at5.
3
4

id.
id.
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online, consumers may lose faith in the authenticity of information if
trademarks do not act as signals to provide contextual and relational
information about products and services. 5 In the three-dimensional
world, the Food and Drug Administration exists to verify the content
of food and medicine at a brick and mortar grocery store. However, no
such governmental agency exists to verify the source and authenticity
of information on an Internet storefront.
The rapidly evolving world of electronic commerce demands
new laws to protect consumers, who may be unable to detect the
"cybersquatters" behind fraudulent and misleading information. Such
protection may currently be found in the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (the "ACPA").6 This article will first examine
trademarks and their importance to consumers over the Internet. In
addition, judicial application of the ACPA to cybersquatting cases will
be evaluated in light of this statute and its underlying legislative intent
to determine whether or not it provides enough protection for
consumers.

II. The Importance of Trademarks to Consumers on the
Internet
The Internet has developed into an efficient medium for
communication, electronic commerce, education, entertainment and a
variety of other uses. 7 The speed and efficiency of the Internet have
transformed this "information superhighway" into an important sector
of both our nation's, and the global, economy. Over $5.3 billion in
retail sales transactions were conducted over the Internet in the last
quarter of 1999 alone. 8 This figure understates the value of e5 Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrinesfor Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C.

L. REv. 695, 704 (1998) (noting that "[C]ontextual and relational information may
be encapsulated in a trademark 'signal.' . . . [A]s information becomes easy to copy

and distribute, the basis for value will lie in the context, relationship, and source of
the information--in essence, a shift from copyright value to trademark value. Thus,
control of trademark rights will take on a heightened importance to both consumers
and businesses in electronic commerce.") (footnote omitted).
6 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)
(2000).
7 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 8 (1999).
8

U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration,

Office of Policy Development, Digital Economy 2000, at 9 (2000), available at

http://www.esa.doc.gov/508/esa/Digita]Economy.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
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commerce in that it ignores transactions between businesses, non-retail
transactions, and the browsing 9consumers perform when choosing, but
not paying for products online.
Growth in the content and use of the Internet is precipitated by
the use of trademarks.' 0 In an attempt to get where they are going,
consumers may use either a search engine or may guess and enter a
domain name to find a desired topic."l A user will often try to guess a
domain name by typing the name of a known product or service,
followed by a top-level domain name, such as ".com," ".net," or
4C
'
.org. ,12
Because of this, the familiarity of a name or mark to the
average Internet user has made the Internet an indispensable tool for
many people today.' 3 Domain names consisting of trademarks 14 are
the identifying signs along the "information
superhighway" and on the
5
awnings of electronic storefronts.'
Trademarks function as a type of assurance that users have
reached their intended destination in cyberspace. 16 Most often
consumers identify the source of information they see by referring to
the URL address on which the page is located.17 If someone is
operating a website using another's trademark, consumers browsing
the site bear a significant risk of being deceived, defrauded, or at a
minimum, confused. 18 Consumer confidence in brand name identifiers,
and in electronic commerce generally, is eroded.' 9 Costs associated
9Id.
10 Competition in Assigning Internet Domain Names: Internet Domain Names

and Intellectual Property Rights: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.,
(1999), available at WL 20010635 (F.D.C.H. 1999) [hereinafter Hearings]
(testimony of Anne Chasser).
" Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 147 F.3d 1036,
1044-45 (9th Cir. 1999).
12 Id.; H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 5 (1999).
13 Hearings,

supra note 10.

14 See,

e.g., http://www.microsoft.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
15 Hearings, supra note 10.
16

Id

" S. REP. No. 106-140, at 5 (1999); see Ford Motor Co. v. Great Domains, Inc.,
141 F. Supp. 2d 763, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (noting that consumers look to domain
names to verify the source of information presented on a website).
18 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 5.
19Id.
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with these risks have become increasingly burdensome for those who
conduct business over the Internet, especially those who have spent
20
significant capital to build up their reputation and trademark identity.
These costs are then passed on to consumers in the form of increased
prices and transaction costs.
Because

trademarks 2 1 and

service

marks 22 are

directly

associated with goods or services by their very definition, often the
user will type a mark23 followed by a ".com," in hopes of finding a
website sponsored by the owner of that exact mark. If a consumer
enters a known trademark as a domain name and is diverted to a web
page registered by someone other than the trademark owner, he may
easily be unaware, misled or deceived. 25 For example, if a consumer is
dissatisfied with a product purchased from a person operating under a
domain name which consists of a trademark, and the consumer
believes that the seller is the owner of the trademark, that consumer
may no longer trust or give patronage to the trademark holder's
business. The effects of improper use are innumerable.
The improper use of trademarks also harms businesses.
Abusive acts prevent markholders from utilizing their own mark in
their own domain name.26 Consumers may be diverted elsewhere,
resulting potentially in lost business opportunities, especially if
diverted by a competitor. 27 Improper use may blur the distinctive
quality of a mark and may tarnish it, causing markholders to spend
significani amounts of capital in restoring lost value.28 Without the
20

Id.

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining trademark as any word, symbol, name,
device or any combination thereof used by a manufacturer or retailer to help
consumers identify and distinguish its product from competitors' products).
22 Id. (defining a service mark as a mark that is used with services, as opposed to
21

goods).

Hereinafter "trademarks" and "service marks" will be referred to as
"trademarks" or simply "marks," as the law that applies is essentially identical.
23

24

Brookfield Communications, 147 F.3d at 1045.

25

Id.; see FordMotor Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d at 777 (concluding that the domain

name "lincolnnavigator.com" would plainly create, in the mind of the consuming
public, a high likelihood that Ford controlled the content of the website at that

domain).
26

H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 6 (1999).

27 id.
28

See Id.
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appropriate legal protection, markholders are required to police and
enforce their own trademark rights or risk losing them. 29 Even with
established laws, trademark owners must be aware of these issues in
order to manage their trademarks effectively. They must keep a lookout for others attempting to use their marks.
Without protection for both consumers and trademark owners,
consumer confidence in the Internet will fade. In addition, companies
that own trademarks may become reluctant to advertise their goods
and services on a medium where their investment in intellectual
property is unprotected. 30 With millions of jobs and billions of dollars
at stake, trademark protection over the Internet should not be
compromised or risked.

III. Cybersquatters' Bad Faith Intent
The value and effectiveness of trademarks as indicators in
cyberspace, is being significantly diminished by "cybersquatters," or
"cyberpirates." Congress defines cybersquatting or cyberpiracy as:
[T]he registration, trafficking in, or use of a domain
name that is identical to, confusingly similar to, or
dilutive of a trademark or service mark of another that
is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain
name, without regard to the goods or services of the
parties, with the bad-faith intent to profit from the
goodwill of another's mark. 3 '
Cyberpirates have various motives for registering others
trademarks as domain names. Cyberpirates often commit virtual
extortion, holding the domain name in order to extract a significant
payment from the mark owner. 32 Many owners have been forced to
pay high sums for the right to engage in electronic commerce under
their own brand names to the cyberpirates who have locked up their
29 Id.
30

Hearings, supra note 10.

"' S. REP. No. 106-140, at 2 (1999).
32

S. REP. No. 106-140, at 5; see Domain Name Clearing Co., L.L.C. v. F.C.F.

Inc., No. 00-2509, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15619, at *2 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that
the cybersquatter in that case retained the domain name and requested payment of
over $60,000).
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marks. 33 Other cyberpirates register trademarks for the sole purpose of
auctioning them off to the highest bidder, regardless of whether that is
the owner or some ill-intentioned third party. 34 Still other cyberpirates
register well-known marks to prey on consumer confusion by
misusing the domain name and diverting 35
consumers from the mark
site.
own
cybersquatter's
owner's site to the
Creating confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of the site is done for a number of reasons. Consumer
confusion may be used to pass off inferior goods under the name of a
well-known markholder, to defraud consumers into providing
personally identifiable information, or even to tarnish the mark's
reputation. 36 Cyberpirates use pornography sites to taint the mark
holder's goodwill and reputation or to extort money from the mark
owner. 37 Advertising sites, which derive revenue based on the number
of visits or "hits" the site receives, have also been used in attempts to
33 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 5 (describing situations where mark owners have paid
cybersquatters high prices for domain names; for example, a small Canadian
company demanded that Umbro International, Inc. pay $50,000 to its sole
shareholder, $50,000 to an Internet charity, and provide a free lifetime supply of
soccer equipment in order for it to relinquish the "umbro.com" name; another
example is that Warner Bros. was reportedly asked to pay $350,000 for the rights to
the
names
"warner-records.com,"
"warner-bros-records.com,"
"warnerpictures.com," "warner-bros-pictures," and "warnerpictures.com").
34 Id. at 5 (describing various occurrences where cybersquatters offered domain
names for sale to the highest bidder, such as the case with "an Australian company
operating on the Internet under the name 'The Best Domains,' which was offering
such domain names as '911porsche.com,' at asking prices of up to $60,911, with a

caption that reads 'PORSCHE: DO I NEED TO SAY ANYTHING?' . . . [A]

similarly enterprising cybersquatter whose partial inventory of domain
names... includes names such as Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Burger King, KFC, McDonalds,
Subway, Taco Bell .... and Volvo, all of which are available to the highest bidder

through an online offer sheet. Also, such [has been] the case where a cybersquatter
placed pornographic images of celebrities on a site under the name 'pentium3.com'
and announced that it would sell the domain name to the highest bidder."). See
Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 267, 270 (noting that
the registrant advised the trademark owner that if it did not buy the domain name for
'a lot of money' the registrant would sell it to the highest bidder).
31S. REP. No. 106-140, at 6; see Horseshoe Bay Resort Sales Co. v. Lake
Lyndon B. Johnson Imp. Corp., 53 S.W.3d 799, 809 (Tex. App. 2001) (noting that
between five and ten customers of a development corporation tried to e-mail the
company through "horseshoebay.com," which had been registered by a cybersquatter
with bad faith intent to profit from this diversion).
36 S. REP.
31 Id.

at 6.

No. 106-140, at 14-15.
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38
tarnish the markholder's reputation through consumer confusion.
These cyber pirates may not have financial motivations, but may
tarnish mark holder's reputation for revenge, to critique the holder, or
for no reason other than to exercise their First Amendment rights. Still
others have39 engaged in unfair competition by preying on consumer

confusion.

Cybersquatters not only register names in bad faith, but they
also may take over unused sites or sites where the original registrant
neglected to re-register the domain name. 40 Finally, cybersquatters
target distinctive marks not only to confuse, but also
to defraud
41
consumers, including engaging in counterfeit activities.
Because businesses have recognized this power and close
association between trademarks and domain names, entities are more
frequently attempting to register and use their trademarks as domain
names. 42 However, cybersquatters have raced these institutions to the
38

Id. (noting the case of a "parent whose child mistakenly typed in the domain

name for 'dosney.com,' expecting to access the family-oriented content of the Walt
Disney home page, only to end up staring at a screen of hardcore pornography
because a cybersquatter had registered that domain name in anticipation that
consumers would make that exact mistake.").
39 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 6 (noting the example of a business operating "under
the domain name 'disneytransportation.com' [that] greets online consumers at its site
with a picture of Mickey Mouse and offers shuttle services in the Orlando area and
reservations at Disney hotels, although the company is in no way affiliated with the
Walt Disney Company and such fact is not clearly indicated on the site. Similarly,
the domain name address 'wwwcarpoint.com,' without a period following 'www,'
was used by a cybersquatter to offer a competing service to Microsoft's popular
Carpoint car buying service.").
40 E.g., Taste: Tony and Tacky, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2002, available at 2002
WL-WSJ 3381995 (describing the case in which the former site of an Indiana Baptist
newspaper was taken over by an apparent cybersquatter who buys old sites and
converts them to X-rated content).
41 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 6 (noting examples of "a cybersquatter ...
[that]
registered the domain names 'attphonecard.com' and 'attcallingcard.com' and used
those names to establish sites purporting to sell calling cards and soliciting
personally identifying information, including credit card numbers [and] the account
of a cybersquatter purporting to sell Dell Computer products under the name
'dellspares.com,' when in fact Dell does not authorize online resellers to market its
products .

. .

. Of even greater concern was the example of an online drug store

selling pharmaceuticals under the name 'propeciasales.com' without any way for
online consumers to tell whether what they are buying is a legitimate product, a
placebo, or a dangerous counterfeit.").
42 H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 5 (1999).
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registration finish line and have often won. Cyberpirates are
consumers' and businesses' worst Internet enemy. Their behavior
undermines consumer confidence, discourages Internet use, and
destroys the value of established brand names and trademarks.43
Cybersquatters relinquish any reliance a consumer may have on the
source and authenticity of information and products on the Internet.
Abusive conduct, like cybersquatting, threatens the continued
growth
44
and vitality of the Internet as a platform for all of its uses.

IV.

The Ineffectiveness of Traditional Trademark Law

Traditional trademark law has "long-recognized the
communicative value of brand-name identifiers, which serve as the
primary indicators of source, quality, and authenticity in the minds of
consumers."45 Initially, courts applied traditional trademark
infringement and dilution law to disputes regarding the abuse of
trademarks as domain names.46 As the foundation for trademark law,
the Lanham Act provides general federal protection from the
unauthorized and confusing use of marks. 47 The Lanham Act was
enacted for two reasons: (1) to protect and enforce trademark owners'

41

See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 5-6.

44Id. at 8.
45 145 CONG. REC. S10515 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999), available at 1999 WL
593845.
46 See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1999)
(stating that they are the third court attempting to apply old law to this new form of
communication); Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998)
(affirming the district court's granting of summary judgment that the registrant
violated the FTDA because he used the names commercially by offering to sell
them); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 147 F.3d
1036, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that use of a mark in the domain name or in
metatags of a site is violative of traditional trademark law when used commercially
and when confusion is very likely). See also Sporty's Farm, L.L.C. v. Sportsman's
Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495-96 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing the shortcomings of
applying the FTDA to cybersquatting cases).
47 See 145 CONG. REc. S7454 (daily ed. Jun. 22, 1999), available at 1995 WL
412237 (discussing protection under the Lanham Act); 133 CONG. REC. S16545-03
(daily ed. Nov. 19, 1987) (discussing amendments to further the purposes of the
Lanham Act); Peaches Entm't Corp. v. Entm't Repertoire Assocs., Inc., 62 F.3d 690,
692 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that "Congress passed the Lanham Act in 1946 to
'federalize' the common law protection of trademarks used in interstate commerce").
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rights, and (2) to protect the public from confusion,
mistake and
48
deception regarding product identity and information.
In 1995, the purposes of the Lanham Act were furthered by an
amendment passed to protect owners not only from trademark
infringement, but also from the dilution of famous marks.49 The
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (the "FTDA") amended the Lanham
Act to provide some justice in the area of trademarks and domain
names." Under the FTDA, a domain name registrant's attempt to sell a
domain name to the trademark owner constituted commercial use,
making the registrant liable for trademark dilution.51
Unfortunately, recovery under the FTDA was limited to
situations in which the cybersquatter commercially used another's
trademark. This provided very limited remedy to the escalating
problem of cybersquatting because many bad faith registrants could
avoid liability if they refrained from offering to sell the domain names
directly to the trademark owner or otherwise use it commercially. 2
Mere trafficking in or the warehousing of domain names consisting of
trademarks may not necessarily give rise to liability under the FTDA.53
Also, the mere registration of another's trademark as a domain name
does not constitute "commercial use," such that the registrant would
be liable under traditional law.54 For bad faith acts by registrants

48

See 145 CONG. REC. S7454, available at 1995 WL 412237 (discussing

protection under the Lanham Act); 133 CONG. REc. S16545-03 (discussing
amendments to further the purposes of the Lanham Act); Peaches Entm't Corp., 62
F.3d at 692 (citing 79 S. REP. No. 1333, at 1 (1946) (discussing that the action for
trademark infringement to protect both consumer confidence in the quality and
source of goods and businesses' goodwill in their products)).
49 Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1301 (C.D. Cal. 1996),
affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
51 141 CONG. REC. S19312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995), available at 1995 WL
770588 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (expressing hope "that this antidilution statute can
help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing
marks that are associated with the products and reputations of others").
51 Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1303; Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp.
1227, 1239 (N.D. I11.1996).
52 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7 (1999).
53 Id. at 7; see Juno Online Servs., L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684,

691 (N.D. I11.1997) ("The mere 'warehousing' of the domain name is not enough to
find that defendant placed the mark on goods or ... services as required.").
54 Panavision,945 F. Supp. at 1303.
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beyond the overt acts of arbitraging a domain name, existing laws had
to be stretched in order to provide remedies."
Furthermore, the FTDA failed to provide adequate remedies
for cybersquatting by requiring a mark to be famous.56 Courts defined

a "famous" mark under the FTDA as "truly prominent and
renowned. '57 This radically high standard did not provide adequate
protection because consumers rely on trademarks that are distinctive,
but not necessarily famous. 8 In short, recovery was precluded under
the FTDA, even if a registrant acted in bad faith, as long as he did not
use the famous mark in a commercial manner.
Remedies under infringement and dilution law were often
uncertain because of the unique nature of Internet law and the cunning
tactics of cyberpirates 9 Remedies and liability depended on how far a
court wanted to stretch existing law.6" The Senate concluded that
"uncertainty as to the trademark law's application to the Internet
produced inconsistent judicial decisions and created extensive
monitoring obligations, unnecessary legal costs, and uncertainty for
consumers
and
trademark
owners
alike."'"
Additionally,
cybersquatters' creative defenses have become increasingly
sophisticated so as to insulate many of them from liability under the
FTDA.62 Instances of cybersquatting increased because there was no
clear deterrent and little incentive for cybersquatters to discontinue

Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1999) ("We
are the third panel of this court in just over a year with the challenging task of
applying centuries-old trademark law to the newest medium of communication - the
Internet.").
56 Id. at 875.
55

Id. (citing I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir.
1998) (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION §
24.91 (2d ed. 1984)).
58 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497-98 (discussing the difference between
57

distinctive and famous (citing Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215-26
(2d Cir. 1999))).
'9 S. REP. No.

106-140, at 7 (1999).

60 See Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 871 (discussing the onerous task of applying
centuries old law to a new medium of communication).
61 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7.
62

Id.
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their abusive practices.63 As a result, traditional trademark laws have
not served justice well in the realm of Internet domain names.
Trademark owners faced significant obstacles in protecting
their marks on the Internet, and often ended up just paying off the
abusive domain name registrant instead of enforcing their rights
through the judicial system.64 Through extensive studies, Congress
found that cybersquatting results in consumer fraud and public
confusion as to the true source or sponsorship of goods and services,
impairs electronic commerce, deprives legitimate trademark owners of
substantial revenues and consumer goodwill and places unreasonable,
intolerable, and overwhelming burdens on trademark owners in
protecting their valuable trademarks.65 Thus, Congress recognized the
significant need to remedy the shortcomings of the traditional
trademark laws as applied to the Internet and cybersquatting.66

V. The Purpose and Intent of the ACPA
The ACPA was enacted in 1999 in response to concerns over
the proliferation of cybersquatting - the Internet version of a land
grab. 67 The ACPA addresses the weaknesses of traditional trademark
law in the realm of Internet domain names and the problems that
personal jurisdiction often presents.68 Specifically, the ACPA was
passed in order to:
protect consumers and American businesses, to
promote the growth of online commerce, and to provide
63 id.

64d.; H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 6-7 (1999) (noting that Gateway paid $100,000
to a cyberpirate who placed pornographic material on a website that was placed at a
URL incorporating Gateway's trademark, "www.gateway2000.com").
65 S. REP. No. 106-140, at2.
66

Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 495 (quoting S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7 (1999))

("While the [FTDA] has been useful in pursuing cybersquatters, cybersquatters have
become increasingly sophisticated as the case law has developed and now take the
necessary precautions to insulate themselves from liability . . . . [Clourts have
sometimes declined to provide assistance to trademark holders, leaving them without
adequate and effective judicial remedies.").
67 Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir.
2001).
68 See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 10.
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clarity in the law for trademark owners by prohibiting
the bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive
marks as Internet domain names with the intent to profit
from the goodwill associated with such marks ...

"

The ACPA creates a federal cause of action against persons or entities
who have bad faith intent to profit from another's mark, and who use a
domain name that resembles or includes that mark.7' For example,
Amazon.com, Inc., now may have a cause of action against a
cybersquatter who registers "amazon.net" in bad faith. To recover
under the ACPA, Amazon.com, Inc. must prove three elements: (1) it
owns a mark, which may be a personal name; (2) the defendant has
bad faith intent to profit from the mark, without regard to the goods or
services of the parties; and (3) the defendant registers, traffics in, or
uses a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to the
plaintiff's mark, if the mark is distinctive or famous at the time of the
defendant's registration of the name, or that was dilutive of that mark
if it was famous at the time of registration. 7' Liability may be found
under the statute for the wrongful use of either registered or common
law trademarks, which may include marks not registered in the United
States. 72 Because courts have been applying these elements to
cybersquatting cases for over two years, we may now analyze how
each of these factors is being applied to cases and how this application
may affect consumers.

See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 495 (quoting S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4

69

(1999)).
70 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)
(2000).
71

id.

72 Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir. 2001)

(holding that § 1127 defines "mark" as "any trademark," not as "registered mark.");
Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1124 (D. Minn. 2000)
(noting that the ACPA covers both registered and common law trademarks). See
Spear, Leeds and Kellog v. Rosado, 122 F. Supp. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

(applying the ACPA to a registered mark as well as common law trademarks that
were not registered, but were sufficiently distinctive).
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VI. Judicial Application of the ACPA
A. The Cause of Action Generally
In order to invoke the protections of the ACPA, a plaintiff must
first show that he owns a mark that is valid and entitled to protection.73
The ACPA appropriately provides remedies for marks that are
distinctive or famous.74 All domain names registered before, on, or
after its date of enactment are subject to liability under the statute.75
Providing remedies for both types of marks is appropriate because a
mark may be famous without being distinctive or a mark may be
distinctive even before it is famous. 76 Furthermore, both famous and
distinctive marks may have significant effects on consumers' ability to
identify products and their sources.
If a mark is famous, the owners' rights are protected from
another's use of the mark in a domain name that is identical,
confusingly similar to, or dilutive of that mark. 77 "Famous" has been
construed to have the same meaning under the ACPA as under the
FTDA. 78 A mark is famous when it has "achieved a wide degree of
recognition by the United States consumer public as the designator of
the plaintiffs goods. ' 79 However, this standard is relatively high. A
mark may be very well known in one geographical market, but may
not meet the legal definition of "famous" because the designator of the
goods is not recognized or known in other geographical markets.8 °
If a mark is distinctive, the owner's rights are protected from
another's use of the mark in a domain name that is "identical or
73 Prime Publishers, Inc. v. American-Republican, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 266,

277 (D. Conn. 2001).
74 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).
75 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 368
(4th Cir. 2001) (citing Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3010, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (holding
that registrant's claim that the ACPA could not be applied retroactively was
invalid)).
76 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497 (citing Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191
F.3d 208, 215-26 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing the difference between distinctive and

famous)).
71 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
78

Prime Publishers, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 277.

79 Id.
80

id.
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confusingly similar" to that mark.8 A mark may be inherently
distinctive or may become distinctive through acquiring secondary
meaning to the consuming public.82 An inherently distinctive mark has
traditionally been one that is arbitrary or fanciful and that identifies the
source of a product or service.83 For example, the "HyperCD" mark
has been held to be suggestive of the owner and its digital analog
conversion software, and thus, it is distinctive.' In contrast, a
competitor is not liable for cybersquatting when it uses a term that is
non-distinctive, or generic.85 Therefore, a registrant would not likely
be liable for registering "cd.com."
Courts have continued to use the traditional analysis for
determining whether a mark is distinctive.86 The Circuit Courts of
Appeal that have ruled on the issue of whether a mark is distinctive
under the ACPA have concluded that the traditional factors
enumerated in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) should be applied.87 Thus, as in
§1125(c)(1), a court may consider the specified factors or any others
that it deems relevant.88 Several specific factors that have been used to
8 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I).
82

Prime Publishers, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 278.

" See Id. at 278-79.
84 BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
85 Golf Warehouse, L.L.C. v. Golfer's Warehouse, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1307,
1312 (D. Kan. 2001) (holding that the term "Golphers' Warehouse" was not
distinctive or famous).
86 See id. at 1309 (stating that "[t]rademark protection falls into one of four
categories or terms: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) subjective or (4) arbitrary or
fanciful."); see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4
(C.A.N.Y. 1976) (establishing the four-part hierarchy of trademark categories used
to determine the distinctiveness of a mark).
87 See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476 (3rd Cir. 2001) (applying the factors of
distinctiveness enumerated in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) to hold that a mark was
distinctive); Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497 n.10 (concluding that the district court
was correct in holding that "sporty's" was distinctive according to the "rigorous
criteria" set forth in § 1125(c)(1)).
88 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002(a), 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(1) (2000) (stating that "a court may consider factors such as, but not limited
to- (A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the
duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with
which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of
the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F)
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establish that a mark is distinctive are: the dollar amount of goods or
services sold by the use of that mark, the number and volume of
transactions under that mark, whether the mark is fictional, and the
duration of conducting business under that mark.89 Because courts are
not expressly limited to considering the listed factors, a plaintiffs
burden is lower under the ACPA relative to the FTDA, for which they
must prove a mark to be famous.9" The lower burden that plaintiff's
must bear in proving distinctiveness in an action under the ACPA
means that more marks, and therefore, more consumers, will be
protected from the bad faith intent of cybersquatters.
Although the ACPA is broad enough to cover famous or
distinctive marks, it is also narrow enough to disallow recovery for
frivolous claims. The statute does this by providing a narrow
definition of "domain name," so as to exclude such things as screen
names and file names in which cybersquatting does not occur.9 Use of
another's trademark as a screen name or file name does not have the
detrimental effects on consumers, against which the ACPA was
intended to protect. Furthermore, the definitions of terms in the ACPA
are consistent with other statutes, where the nature of the Internet did
not require the definitions to be broadened. For example, the definition
of "Internet" is consistent with the Communications Act.92 Also,
"trafficking" may consist of a wide variety of transactions which may
the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used
by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the
nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H)
whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.").
89 See Victoria's Cyber Secret Ltd. P'ship v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F.
Supp. 2d 1339, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that a mark was distinctive after
considering the named factors and where large advertising budgets and extensive
promotion of merchandise bearing the mark had made the mark known worldwide);
Domain Name Clearing Co., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15619, at *9 (holding that a
registered trademark was distinctive because it had been used in $4.5M in marketing
and over $100M in sales of cosmetics for a period of over twenty years by the
holder).
90 See Shields, 254 F.3d at 482 (stating that the ACPA provides recovery for
marks that are either distinctive or famous); Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875
(discussing the FMDA's requirement that a mark be famous).
9' S.
92

REP. No. 106-140, at 8-9, 10 (1999); H.R. REP. No. 106-412 at 4 (1999).
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(1) (defining "Internet" as "the international computer

network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data
networks."); S. REP. No. 106-140, at 10; H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at4.
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affect consumers, including "sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses,
exchanges of currency, and any other transfer for consideration or
receipt in exchange for consideration."93
Additionally, the ACPA encourages cooperation and fairness.
It codifies the case law limiting the secondary liability of domain
name registrars for the act of registration of a domain name, absent
bad-faith on the part of the registrar and registry.94 Domain name
registrars should be exposed to very minimal liability for those who
register another's trademark in bad faith.95 The ACPA specifically
states that a registrar will not be liable unless their action or inaction
provides evidence of bad faith or reckless disregard.96 Furthermore,
cooperation with court orders is encouraged, because the statute
specifically states that liability may arise for any registrar's willful
failure to comply with any such order.9 7
Another benefit for consumers is that the ACPA provides in
rem jurisdiction in cases where consumers may not have been
protected because of a court's lack of personal jurisdiction.98 This is a
critical advantage in cases where the domain name registrant has
provided false or misleading contact information to the name registrar
or fails to update that information over time.
Remedies under § 1125 are "in addition to any other civil
action or remedy otherwise applicable."99 Therefore, the ACPA does
not limit traditional trademark, unfair competition, false advertising, or
dilution law remedies such as injunctive relief, recovery of profits,
actual damages and costs. The ACPA also provides for statutory
damages in cybersquatting cases in the amount of $1000 to
$100,000.' ° Damages and injunctive relief are available for domain
93 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002(a),
1125(d)(1)(E) (2000).

15 U.S.C. §

94 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 10; H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 4.

95 See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980,

985 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the registrar should not be held liable because it
could not be expected to monitor and control the registrants).
96

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(ii).

97 Id.
98

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).

99 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(3).
100 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3003(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d)

(2000).
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names registered after the enactment date, however, new remedies
Thus, only equitable relief, such as an
apply only prospectively.'
injunction, may be imposed for domain names registered on or prior to

the statute's enactment on November 29,

1999.12

Remedies for in rem

actions under the Act are also limited to an order for the forfeiture or
cancellation of the domain name." 3 These remedies and the general
provisions of the ACPA were drafted so as to balance the rights at
issue.
Within four months of the ACPA's enactment, the Second
Circuit concluded that it was "a particularly good fit" with
cybersquatting cases that were previously brought under traditional
trademark law."0 The Second Circuit even applied the Act to a case on
appeal, although the district court's decision was based on the
FTDA °5 The circuit court's apparent willingness to use and apply the
ACPA was a promising development for consumers. Thus far, courts
have applied these provisions in a fair and equitable manner, so as to
provide appropriate protection for Internet users and Internet authors.
B. The Requirement of "Identical or Confusingly Similar" or
"Dilutive"
Much of the litigation that has been brought under the ACPA
has been related to whether a domain name is "identical or confusingly
similar" to a distinctive or famous protected mark. 6 This statutory
language suggests a simple and direct comparison between the domain
name and the protected mark."7 Judicial application of a simple, direct
comparison is consistent with Congress' intent to curb cybersquatters
who may act in bad faith without using the names in commerce and
without necessarily offering to sell the names to the markholder. °8
1o1Peoplefor the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 368 (citing Pub. L.
No. 106-113, § 3010, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (stating that the ACPA precludes the
imposition of damages in cases in which domain names were registered, trafficked,
or used before its enactment)).
102 Id.
103

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i).

lO4 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497.
105 Id.
106

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).

N. Light Tech. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 117 (D. Mass. 2000).
'0' Id. at 117.
107
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When the domain name and the mark are identical, the test is simple.
The taking of an identical copy of another's famous or distinctive
mark for use as a domain name creates a presumption of confusion
among users as a matter of law."° The registrant may provide evidence
to rebut this presumption, but often the analysis just moves onto the
next element of "bad faith."' 0
The "confusingly similar" test gives rise to significantly more
debate. Courts have differed about the appropriate analysis for
determining which domain names may be confusing and sufficiently
similar to the mark at issue. "' As a general rule, if a company can
show that consumers were confused, then it usually wins because
actual confusion also indicates bad faith.1 2 However, actual confusion
is not a requirement to succeed under this cause of action." 3 Because a
domain name is the major identifying characteristic of a website, if the
mark and the domain name create confusion among consumers,
mitigating factors may be insufficient to demonstrate a noninfringing
use." 4 Courts have consistently held that insignificant changes to a
mark do not make the mark any less "confusingly similar."'" 5 Thus,
any domain name that simply adds ".com" or some other domain
identifier at the end of a mark or similar variation thereof is "identical

109 Victoria's Cyber Secret, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
10

See, e.g., id. (noting that the determination of whether a mark is confusingly

similar and whether the registrant had bad faith may then be combined into one
inquiry, in this case, whether or not the alleged cybersquatter, recognizing the fame,
tremendous goodwill and selling power inherent in the "Victoria's Secret" mark,
without authorization, deliberately and intentionally misappropriated the mark).
...
See Ford Motor Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d at 774; Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497-

98.
112

Zach Schiller, Ameritech Sues Two over Web Domains, THE PLAIN DEALER,

Apr. 7, 2001, at 1C, available at 2001 WL 20546054 (citing Joe Dreitler, a partner at
Jones Day, Reavis & Pogue in Columbus, who represents companies in trademark
and Internet cases).
1" FordMotor Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
114 id.
"5 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497-98 (holding that because
apostrophes may
not be used in domain names that "Sporty's" is confusingly similar to

"sportys.com");

Prime Publishers, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 283 (holding that the

registered domain name is confusingly similar to a publisher's trademark because the
only difference was the prefix "ct" in the domain name).
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or confusingly similar" to that trademark." 6 Furthermore, the addition
of any spaces, signs, or punctuation to a trademark for use as a domain
name is inconsequential. "7 This common sense approach suggests that
judges are putting themselves in the seats of regular Internet
consumers. Looking at the cybersquatting cases in a practical way,
rather than a legal or technical way, will provide greater protection for
consumers from deceptive tactics used on the Internet.
Beyond the punctuation and ".com's," however, courts have
differed significantly in how to interpret "confusingly similar.' 1 8
Marks incorporated into domain names may satisfy the "identical or
confusingly similar" requirement for stating a claim, but may not be so
confusing to demand liability. 9 In one particular case,
"4fordparts.com," "lincolntrucks.com," and "volvoguy.com" were not
confusing enough to establish liability. 2 However, another court held
that domain names are "confusingly similar" where the names
consisted of trademarks, coupled with a description of their services or
geographic location, and where the registrant admitted the domain
names were registered with the intent of attracting confused customers
to

his

own

site.' 2 '

The

court

concluded

that

"mgmgrandhotelcasino.com," "goldennuggetlasvegas.com," and other
names are confusingly similar to the Las Vegas hotels and casinos
bearing practically the same names. In another case, the incorporation
of the additional word "sexy," between the two words making up the

116

Cline v. 1-888-Plumbing Group, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 351, 367 n.5

(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the lack of separating spaces, the choice of
punctuation or the addition of a domain identifier has little or no significance).
117 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497-98 (concluding that because apostrophes
cannot be used in domain names, the distinction between "Sporty's" and
"sportys.com" is inconsequential); Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 639
(E.D. Pa. 2000), affirmed by 254 F.3d 476 (3rd Cir. 2001) (holding that
"joescartoon.com" is confusingly similar to plaintiff's domain name
"joecartoon.com"); Morrison & Foerster v. Wisk, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130 (D.
Colo. 2000) (holding that because ampersands are not allowed in domain names, the
difference between "www.morrisonfoerster.com" and the protected mark
"MORRISON & FOERSTER" is inconsequential).
118 Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 270-71; Mirage Resorts, Inc. v. Stirpe, 152 F.
Supp. 2d 1208 (D. Nev. 2000).
FordMotor Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
120 id.
"9

121

MirageResorts, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 1210, 1213.
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trademark "Victoria's Secret" was sufficient to establish liability.'
Often, as in these cases, the "confusingly similar" analysis depends on
23
evidence that the registrant acted in bad faith. 1
The analysis by courts considering bad faith acts in
determining whether a domain name and trademark are "confusingly
similar" is faulty. In order for consumers to be effectively protected,
and to fulfill the intent of Congress, a simple, practical comparison
between the domain name and the trademark must be performed. If
there is any chance of consumer confusion as to the sponsorship or
source of the domain name, analysis should continue on to whether or
not evidence of bad faith exists. If there is no chance of consumer
confusion, no liability would be established.
Many courts have properly construed the "confusingly similar"
element to include "typosquatters."'' 24 Typosquatters are those who
register commonly misspelled trademarks as domain names. 125 Also,
someone who registers a domain name consisting of a trademark
followed by "com," so as to capitalize on the instances in which the
"dot" is unintentionally left out by the Internet user may be considered
a typosquatter. 126 This form of cybersquatter takes advantage of
Internet users' misspellings or typographical errors with regard to
domain names and trademarks. In practice, a consumer may not
recognize that she made an error if that error brings her to a website
that she believes may be, or is, sponsored by the mark owner she
intended to find.
122

Victoria's Cyber Secret, 161

F.

"victoriasexysecret.com,"

Supp.

2d at

1346 (holding

that

"victoriassexsecret.com" and other variations are
confusingly similar to the trademark "Victoria's Secret").
11 Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 264, 271 (concluding that the domain name
"vw.net" is confusingly similar to the automobile manufacturer's famous "VW"
mark so that the manufacturer was entitled to have the name transferred to itself,
where the name owner had registered it in bad faith because it was not an Internet
service provider - previously required for the ".net" top-level name - and at the time
of registration, it was aware of the potential confusion with the "VW" mark, and has
stated to the manufacturer that users would instinctively use the "vw.net" address to
link to manufacturer's website).
124
See, e.g., Shields, 254 F.3d at 485 (affirming the district court's decision that
the registrant was liable under the ACPA for registering several misspellings of
another's trademark); Victoria's Cyber Secret, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1351 (noting that
registering Internet domain names which are intentional misspellings of famous
trademarks violates the ACPA).
125 Shields, 254 F.3d at 483.
126

See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 6 (1999).
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The ACPA has stood its ground in protecting consumers from
typosquatters. The statute has been applied to those individuals and
entities registering domain names that are intentional misspellings of
distinctive or famous marks. 127 This application is consistent with
Congressional intent. 128 Liability has been particularly significant
where a cybersquatter admitted to registering domain names because
29
they were likely misspellings of famous marks or personal names.
This, coupled with evidence of electronic mail was admitted to show
the extent of consumer confusion caused by the cybersquatter's sites,
giving rise to significant liability of $100,000 per domain name.13 ° By
holding typosquatters liable under the ACPA, courts are extending and
ensuring the protection of consumers under the statute.
Because the ACPA precludes consideration of the type of
goods and services offered by the parties,' it provides for greater
consumer protection than the FTDA.132 Currently, a defendant may no
longer escape liability by purporting to offer goods or services slightly
different in nature from that which the trademark owner sells.'33 This

factor, while important in a typical infringement case, is not as
relevant as when the confusion occurs online. With a two dimensional
storefront or informational website, much more is at issue than
whether a consumer will likely confuse the products or services
offered by different vendors. Consumers must be able to depend on the

127

See Shields, 254 F.3d at 485.

128

See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 6.

129

Shields, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 640-41 (E.D. Pa. 2000), affirmed by 254 F.3d 476

(3rd Cir. 2001) (holding that "joescartoon.com" and "joecarton.com" are confusingly
similar to plaintiff's "joecartoon.com").
13

0 Id.

13' Anticybersquatting

Consumer Protection Act § 3002(a), 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(1)(A) (2000) ("A person shall be liable... if, without regard to the goods or
services of the parties, that person... has a bad faith intent to profit ....
").
132 See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497 n.1 1 (noting that "confusingly similar" is
a different standard than the "likelihood of confusion" test for trademark
infringement).
133 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) ("A person shall be liable ... if, without
regard to the goods or services of the parties, that person ... has a bad faith intent to
profit ....").But see Yellowbrix, Inc. v. Yellowbrick Solutions, Inc., 181 F. Supp.
2d 575, 582 (E.D.N.C. 2001) (concluding that because the registrant and owner were
not competitors and the products were different by improperly applying a factor of
"likelihood of confusion").
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information provided to them and the source behind such information
must be identifiable and reliable.
C. The Requirement of "Bad Faith Intent to Profit"
The ACPA sets forth a list of non-exclusive factors that a court
may use to assist them in determining whether a registrant possessed
the requisite "bad faith intent to profit" from a mark.134 The
registration of multiple domain names may be consistent with honest
business practices.'
Congress acknowledged this possibility by
drafting the ACPA such that the factors are non-exhaustive and nonexclusive.136 The ACPA expressly states that a court may consider
other factors that may tend to indicate that the registrant acted in bad
faith or that the safe harbor provision applies. 37 The enumerated
factors address some of the specific problems the Internet presents,
and suggest ways that cybersquatters have used abusive and deceptive
tactics in bad faith, some of which escaped liability under traditional
law. These factors re-emphasize the ACPA's goal of protecting
consumers. For example, one of the factors that courts always consider
is whether a registrant attempts to divert consumers from their
intended site.'38
In determining whether the registrant acted in bad faith, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals used a "totality of the circumstances"
approach in one recent case.'39 Virtual Works, Inc. registered and used
114

15 U.S.C. § 1l25(d)(1)(B) (stating nine factors a court may consider in

determining whether the registrant acted in bad faith, but also stating that a court is
not limited to considering those factors).
"5 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 9 (1999).
36

1

Id. at 9-10.

...15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i); see Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 267-69.
138 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V).
139

Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 270 (4th

Cir. 2001); see also Horseshoe Bay Resort Sales Co. v. Lake Lyndon B. Johnson
Imp. Corp., 53 S.W.3d 799, 810 (Tex. App. 2001) (concluding that a likelihood of
confusion existed between the mark "Horseshoe Bay," used by the development
corporation, and "horseshoebay.com," used by the real estate company, because
"Horseshoe Bay" was arbitrary and had acquired a secondary meaning, both parties
named on the Internet to reach potential customers, the defendant registered the
name - along with "horseshoebay.cc" - specifically to benefit from the development
corporation's reputation and goodwill, defendant had never before used the name,
and there was evidence that five to ten consumers had been confused about the name
and tried to email the development company through "horseshoebay.com").
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"vw.net" as its own domain name.'" Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
holder of the famous "VW" mark, filed suit. 4' The Fourth Circuit
considered all factors that it deemed relevant, holding that the
registrant acted in bad faith because he never registered the domain
name as a trademark and had not conducted, and never intended to
conduct business under the domain name in question. 142 Furthermore,
use of the domain name created a likelihood of confusion, the
registrant had used the name to disparage the markholder, and the
registrant had offered to sell the name to the markholder.'43 Because all
of these factors together, the totality of the circumstances, weighed in
favor of the mark owner, the court imposed liability upon the
registrant even though its initials constituted the owner's famous
mark.
Another "totality of the circumstances" analysis has been
exhibited by the District Court of the Southern District of Florida.'45 A
cybersquatter registered and used a domain name consisting of a slight
variation of the Victoria's Secret trademark. 146 The court found that the
registrant acted in bad faith by registering the particularly distinctive
and famous mark, where no connection existed between the domain
names and their proposed use, and no reason existed for that exact
choice of words other than to capitalize on the owner's mark.'4 7 By

considering many factors even beyond those specifically listed in the
statute, this analysis seems like a balanced approach in seeking the
truth about whether or not the registrant acted with intentions that may
be detrimental to consumers.
Many other courts have had the chance to determine what
constitutes bad faith under the ACPA, but have refrained from using a

140

Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 266.

141 id.
142

Id. at 269-70.

143 Id.

144 Id.

145 See

Victoria's Cyber Secret, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1353.
146 Id. at 1341 (noting that the plaintiff registered four Internet domain names:
"victoriassexsecret. corn," "victoriassexysecret.com," "victoriasexsecret.com," and
"victoriasexysecret.com").
147

Id. at 1347-49.
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"totality of the circumstances" analysis. 48 Typically, this is because
just one or two of the registrants' actions have been severe enough to
establish bad faith.'49 The fact that a domain name resembles or is
confusingly similar to a famous trademark does not, alone, establish
bad faith.' 5° The registrant's precise actions must show bad faith
15
intent. '
Specific acts by a registrant may constitute bad faith per se.
Generally, a registrant's attempt to sell the domain name at an inflated
price is indicative of bad faith.'52 A registrant who offers to sell a
domain name to the mark owner and then offers to sell the domain
name to the highest bidder may be liable under the ACPA' 53 Also, the
54
registration of multiple marks may be enough to establish liability.
The District Court of Oregon found that such was the case with one
recent cybersquatting occurrence.'55 The court held that bad faith may
be inferred where the domain name registrant provided no services
relating to the domain name and it had registered other well-known
names with which it had no apparent connection. 56 In another case, an
Internet domain name owner was held liable for registering various
domain names in order to sell them in the future because he made a
business out of the process. 57 Thus, the single act of registering or
148

See Domain Name Clearing Co., L.L.C. v. F.C.F. Inc., No. 00-2509, 2001

U.S. App. LEXIS 15619, at *7-*8 (holding that the registrant acted in bad faith by
registering a mark as a domain name and attempting to sell the domain name); see
also Golf Warehouse, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1307; Ford Motor Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d at
763.
149 See Domain Name Clearing Co., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15619, at *7-*8

(holding that registering a mark as a domain name and attempting to sell the domain
name was sufficient to establish bad faith).
150 Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 269.
15' See Golf Warehouse, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1312 (granting summary judgment
because the use of a generic name cannot constitute a deceptive act and no evidence
of misuse was proven).
152

Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 270.

...See id. at 267, 271.
154 See Shields, 254 F.3d at 485.
155 See Zipee Corp. v. U.S. Postal Service, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1087 (D. Or.

2000).
56

1

id.

157 Domain Name Clearing Co., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15619, at *7-*8
(concluding that the registrant registered various marks as domain names may be
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attempting to sell names consisting of marks, if done with "bad faith
intent to profit," may be enough to establish liability.'58
Nonetheless, some courts have denied concluding that one act
alone may show bad faith per se. The Fourth Circuit has stated that a
mere offer to sell an Internet domain name alone was not proof of
unlawful trafficking in bad faith.'59 On the other hand, a registrant's
other acts, in addition to intending or offering to sell a name, may
likely give rise to liability." 6 In order to establish liability, the actions
of the registrant should be enough such that any reasonable person
may infer that the acts were done in bad faith.
Furthermore, the mental state of the registrant may be
irrelevant to the requirement of bad faith in certain circumstances. 6 '
For example, "bad faith intent to profit" has been proven when a
person used a domain name that is confusingly similar to a mark that
was distinctive and famous at the time the name was registered,
regardless of what the registrant knew at the time of registration.'62 In
short, although the court must determine whether "bad faith intent"
existed, it may not be a question of actual knowledge of the mark
itself.
Additionally, the consumer protection function of the ACPA
has been the deciding factor behind courts' decisions.'63 For example,
the Fourth Circuit recently held that although a domain name
registrant thought that his use of a mark was lawful, the registrant
acted in bad faith."6 The registrant posted information on the site at
the domain name "peta.org" that was insulting to the owners of the
enough to establish liability because it made a business out of registering and selling
the names).
158 See Ford Motor Co. v. Great Domains, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647-48
(E.D. Mich. 2001) (concluding that liability for mere registration may be considered
under the ACPA but not under other theories of trademark liability).
151 Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 270 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-464, at 111
(1999)).
160 See Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 271.
161

March Madness Athletic Ass'n, L.L.C. v. Netfire, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 560,

573 (N.D.Tex. 2001) (concluding that the knowledge, or lack thereof, of a registrant
at the time of registration, is irrelevant as to whether he may be liable under the
ACPA).
162 id.
163
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PETA trademark, the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
organization.' 65 The court drew this conclusion because the registrant
did not have any intellectual property rights in the mark or anything
similar to it, he used the domain name in a commercial manner, and
clearly intended to confuse, mislead and divert Internet users into
accessing his site.' 66 Also, his site contained antithetical information
that was harmful to the goodwill of the mark owner.'67 In this case, the
court focused on the consumer protection function of the ACPA and
placed significant weight on the acts that were potentially detrimental
to consumers.'68
Courts' application of the ACPA's factors in determining bad
faith has been relatively fair. Courts have attempted to consider all
evidence of bad faith, whether it is in regard to a specific factor in the
statute or otherwise. Courts have been achieving a balance by using
the enumerated factors to determine whether the registrant's use is fair
or in bad faith, but are not being limited to those factors. This is
important because Congress is not able to predict all of the ways that
cybersquatters may use the Internet to defraud and mislead. Overall,
the "totality of the circumstances" approach is most beneficial to
consumers, who are harmed in various foreseen and unforeseen ways
by the bad faith intent of cybersquatters.
D. Defenses to Liability Under the ACPA
While the ACPA provides broad protection to mark owners
and consumers, the statute does not over-protect because it allows for
all of the defenses to traditional trademark law.169 In considering
whether a defense precludes liability, courts must carefully balance the
legitimate interests of Internet authors with other interests for which
protection is intended. 7 ' By protecting the rights of Internet users and
the interests of all Americans in free speech and protected uses, the
ACPA provides an optimal balance. This statute only targets those
165

Id. at 362-63.

166

Id. at 369.

167

Id. at 365-66.
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See Id. at 369.
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intending to profit from another's mark or otherwise use it in bad
faith.17 ' Parody, comment, criticism, comparative advertising, and
news reporting are all excused from liability under the First
17 2
Amendment, and are not targeted under the ACPA.
A registrant may also be excused from liability if the safe
harbor provision applies.'73 The safe harbor provision, as codified by
the ACPA, applies when a registrant "believed and had reasonable
grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or
was otherwise lawful."' 74 However, the ACPA remains focused on
consumer protection by providing that a domain name registrant who
acts even partially in bad faith is not, as a matter of law, entitled to
benefit from the safe harbor provision or fair use defense.' 5 The
openly admitted hope of profiting from consumer confusion of its
Internet domain name with another's mark has been sufficient to
disqualify a registrant from using the safe harbor provision.'76
Furthermore, a defendant who claims the safe harbor defense may not
escape liability if the totality of the circumstances and his actions after
registration, demonstrate intent to profit from the mark.'77
While sites used as a parody or negative comment may be
excused under the First Amendment, sites used by fans to display and
share their admiration have also been subject to threats of liability.'78
Although this presents a risky situation for individuals on the
authoring side of the Internet, courts are likely to apply the ACPA in
the equitable manner that they have thus far, so as to prevent
subjecting fans to unjust liability.
17115
172
113

U.S.C. § 1125(d); S.REP. No. 106-140, at 13.
S. REP. No. 106-140, at 13.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).

174Id.
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Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 369; Virtual Works,
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176 Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 271.
177Victoria's Cyber Secret,

161 F. Supp. 2d at 1349 (concluding that bad faith
intent to profit from the trademark was evidenced by the totality of the

circumstances).
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E.g., Brilliant!, LONDON TIMEs, Nov. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL

29849981 (noting how naive Warner Bros. was recently when it served a teenage
girl with legal papers due to her registration of 'www.harrypotterguide.co.uk,' on
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Unfortunately, the ACPA does not cure all cybersquatterrelated headaches. Some famous trademarks have been incorporated
into dozens, or even hundreds of unauthorized domain names. A
trademark owner with one hundred cybersquatter problems may have
to file just that many lawsuits to protect his rights. This poses a
significant obstacle to mark owners. Additionally, the courts cannot
handle this explosive caseload. Thus, the government and other groups
are advocating alternative dispute resolution.'79 Furthermore, the First
Amendment may protect some "negative comment" sites where the
owner has exhibited bad faith. However, if the courts continue to
examine the "big picture" of a case when deciding it, justice will
continue to prevail under the ACPA. 80

VII. Conclusion
Considering the large volume of consumer dollars being
transferred through e-commerce, 8 the increasing number of
households gaining Internet access, 8 ' and the difficulty in deciphering
the exact source and authenticity of material throughout the World
Wide Web, laws must be applied so as to protect consumers and their
hard-earned dollars. Since its inception, the ACPA has effectively
played its protective role by significantly subsidizing the inability of
consumers to verify the true source of information in this new world of
electronic storefronts.
The ACPA was not enacted and has not been applied to give
companies the rights to every possible combination of letters that bears

179 Donna L. Howard, Trademarks and Service Marks and Internet
Domain

Names: Giving ICANN Deference, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637 (2001) (describing in detail
the differences between vindicating intellectual property rights under the ACPA and
under alternative dispute resolution according to ICANN).
180 See Bally Total Fitness Holding Corporation v. Faber, 29
F. Supp. 2d 1161,
1165 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding the defendant not liable for using
"compupix.com/ballysucks" as the URL for a site devoted to consumer complaints
about Bally Total Fitness because the average consumer would not be likely to
assume that Bally was affiliated with a site dedicated to criticizing the organization).
181 U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration,
Office of Policy Development, Digital Economy 2000 at 9 (2000), available at
http://www.esa.doc.gov/508/esa/DigitalEconomy.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
182 145 CONG. REC. S10519 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999), available at 1999 WL
593845.
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any similarity to a protected mark. 18 3 Although large companies with
many resources have been increasingly issuing cease and desist letters
to almost any registrant who incorporates part or all of their mark into
a domain name," 8 this is a broad and incorrect application by large
trademark owners. When these owners attempt to back up their letters
in court, the courts will not stand for it. The ACPA was enacted, and
has been applied in most cases, just liberally enough to prevent the
expropriation of protected marks in cyberspace and to abate
consumers' confusion resulting from such use. The matter at hand is
one of ensuring that the consumer knows that the goods and services
he is viewing on the Internet are genuine, safe, and reliable while
protecting the investment of a trademark owner in the same way it is
protected in other forms of media.'85 Courts have begun to use the
ACPA so as to provide a more safe, reliable electronic world for
consumers and trademark owners. In effect, the ACPA has become an
authoritative presence on the cyber streets of e-commerce, striking a
unique balance between the interests involved.
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184 See, e.g., The Guide to Marijuanaon the Internet, at http://www.yahooka.
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